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THE DEFENDANT JORDAN SCHOOL DISTRICT,
HAVING NO STATUTORY RESPONSIBILITY
FOR THE REGULATION, MITIGATION OR HANDLING
OF "HAZARDOUS MATERIALS", IS NOT WITHIN
THE CLASS OF GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES FOR WHICH
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of their limited area of responsibility.
This Court's decision in the case of Williams vs Board of
Education, 780 P.2d 818 (Utah Supreme Court 1989)], is authority
for

the

proper,

common-sense

analysis

of

the

scope

of

"governmental immunity". In Williams the school district argued
that the run-off of stormwaters onto the "downhill" adjoining
propertyowner was immunized from suit, by reason of the Act,
because

the

district

was

engaged

in

the

"management

of

floodwaters". This hypertechnical argument WAS REJECTED by this
Court which engaged in a common-sense reading of the Act and
thereafter wrote:
We do not need to reach here the question of
whether the second paragraph of section 63-30-3
provides "absolute immunity" for the flood control
activities of governmental entities. That is because
we hold that defendant's activities in the instant case
simply do not come within the contemplation of
paragraph two. . . . Under this standard of review, the
facts in the record clearly indicate that plaintiff's
damages from the runoff surface waters which are the
subject of this action are not the result of
defendant's "management of flood waters and other
natural disasters (or] the construction, repair, and
operation of flood and storm systems." Defendant school
district has no such statutory responsibility
We do not believe it was the legislature's intention in
enacting the 1984 amendment to shield defendant from
possible liability for damages arising from its
negligence in the resurfacing of a parking lot, a
question of fact to be determined on remand. Like
private property owners, owners of public property must
exercise reasonable care in controlling surface waiter
runoff.
780 P.2d at 820-821. Emphasis added.
Contrary to the assertions of the DISTRICT, Williams IS a
"persuasive

analogy"

(opposing

counsel's

term,

p.

15

of

APPELLEE'S BRIEF) for the proposition that the Court engage in a

2

common-sense reading AND APPLICATION of the Governmental Immunity
Act.
The odors, vapors and gases from the sewer vent pipe are
legally

no different from the run-off waters from the parking

lot in Williams and for which the public entity may be held
liable!

[Indeed, if there is a difference between the sewer

gases, odors and vapors and the runoff waters, it is only that in
the case at bar that the JORDAN SCHOOL DISTRICT has INTENTIONALLY
ACTED

to take

those gases, vapors and odors

which would

arguably have remained in the underground sewer line

and "vent"

them into the atmosphere a mere 17 feet away from Plaintiffs'
residence!]
As the Williams decision correctly noted in connection with
"management of flood waters", the Jordan School District in this
case has NO STATUTORY RESPONSIBILITY to manage "hazardous wastes"
within the contemplation of the Governmental Immunity Act and
thus should enjoy no "immunity" from suit for its negligence.
Essentially similar results were reached by this Court in
its decision in Branam vs Provo School District, 780 P. 2d 810
(Utah Supreme Court 1989), in which this Court wrote:
In the present case, the district certainly does
not fall within the intendment of the statute. It was
not charged with the responsibility to deal with flood
waters or to construct flood or storm systems, and the
school did not act to protect the public at large from
flood waters. Its actions were indistinguishable from
those any other landowner might have taken to protect
its property. As such, it enjoys no immunity from
Branam's suit under section 63-30-3 of the Code.
780 P.2d at 813. Emphasis added.
Similar results are found in this Court's decision in
3

Sanford vs University of Utah, 488 P. 2d 741, 26 Utah 2d 285
(1971) [claims for "nuisance" injuries to neighbor NOT immunized
under Governmental Immunity Act].
II
THE ROUTINE HANDLING AND DISPOSAL OF "DOMESTIC SEWAGE"
AND ITS CONSTITUENTS, INCLUDING HYDROGEN SULFIDE GAS,
DOES NO ENCOMPASS HANDLING "HAZARDOUS WASTE" OR
"HAZARDOUS MATERIALS" AS CONTEMPLATED BY
THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
If the Court adopts the common-sense, limited reading and
application of the "governmental immunity" as per Williams,
Standford and Branam, discussed in Point I, above, the Court need
not

engage

in the "daisy-chain"

analysis

advocated

by the

Defendant DISTRICT.
The arguments of the Defendant SCHOOL DISTRICT

[that

Subsection 63-30-10(18) retains "immunity" against suit

for

Section 8 ("dangerous condition of structures") AND for Section
9 ("defective public building or structure") BUT NOT for Section
10.5

("inverse

condemnation")

claims]

are jurisprudentially

correct ONLY IF the DISTRICT was actually engaged in handling
"hazardous wastes" or "hazardous materials". Thus, the first step
in ascertaining whether the Defendant DISTRICT is "immune" from
suit is to determine whether or not the "hydrogen sulfide" is
EITHER (1) a "hazardous material" OR (2) a "hazardous waste".
At the outset the Court should keep in mind that in the
context of the "public health" and "environmental protection
statutes", there is an intentional and consistent "ranking" of
the described

"wastes" and "materials". This

"ranking"

as

evidenced

the

statutory

and

by

type

and

depth
4

of

the

administrative

controls

and

the

imposed

violation of the regulatory scheme

penalties

for

the

is generally as follows:

1.

unregulated "wastes"

2.

"solid wastes" [i.e. regular landfill-type wastes]

3.
"hazardous wastes" ["solid wastes" which, for some
identified reason, are particularly "hazardous": e.g.
asbestos-laden construction debris, which requires
specially permitted and constructed designated landfill
disposal, etc.]
4.
"hazardous materials" [not per se "wastes", but
intentionally-created and controlled "materials", which
are truly hazardous: the discharge of such materials
into the environment brings out the "haz mat response
teams" with their "space suits", "kitty litter", and so
forth!]
5.
"toxic wastes" and "toxic substances" [the truly
deadly stuff]
A careful analysis of the pertinent statutes and administrative
regulations

evidences

a

clear

legislative

intent

that

the

"hydrogen sulfide" gas, as a naturally-occurring by-product of
putrification

within

"domestic

sewage"

falls

within

the

unregulated "wastes" [#1 in the listing], rather than at the #4
level as the DISTRICT asserts.
A
HYDROGEN SULFIDE GAS, AS A NATURALLY-OCCURRING
BY-PRODUCT OF THE PURIFICATION OF "DOMESTIC SEWAGE"
IN RELATIVELY SMALL QUANTITIES, IS NOT A
"HAZARDOUS WASTE" FOR WHICH IMMUNITY ATTACHES
The term "hazardous waste" is NOT DEFINED within the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act. Thus, it is perhaps instructive and
helpful

but not necessarily

controlling

for the Court to

consider other statutory definitions of the phrase. The phrase
"hazardous waste" IS DEFINED within Section 19-6-102, entitled

5

"Definitions", as part of the "Solid and Hazardous Waste Act" of
Utah, as follows:
(9) "Hazardous waste" means a solid waste or
combination of solid wastes other than household waste
which, because of its quantity, concentration, or
physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics may
cause or significantly increase serious irreversible or
incapacitating reversible illness or may pose a
substantial present or potential hazard to human health
or the environment when improperly treated, stored,
transported, disposed of, or otherwise managed.
Emphasis added. Thus, for the "hydrogen sulfide" gas to be a
"hazardous waste", it must be a "solid waste", which is "defined"
in Subsection 19-6-102(17), as follows:
(17)(a)
"Solid waste" means any garbage, refuse,
sludge, including sludge from a waste treatment plan,
water supply treatment plant, or air pollution control
facility, or other discarded material, including solid,
liquid, semi-solid, or contained gaseous material
resulting from industrial, commercial, mining, or
agricultural operations and from community activities
but does not include solid or dissolved materials in
domestic sewage or in irrigation return flows or
discharges for which a permit is required under Title
19, Chapter 5, Water Quality Act, or under the Water
Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C., Section 1251 et seq.

Emphasis added. The first point of analysis would be to determine
if the "hydrogen sulfide" (as a "gaseous material") is a "solid".
It isn't! That conclusion should truncate any further need for
analysis.
Continuing with the statutory analysis, the gaseous material
is a "solid or dissolved materials in domestic sewage". The
phrase

"domestic

sewage" defines and describes

the routine

sanitary sewer discharges from the Riverton Elementary School
consisting entirely of human wastes from the school restroom

6

facilities (sinks and toilets), drinking fountains, and/or the
water

discharges

from

food-preparation

activities

conducted

within the school cafeteria. The phrase "domestic sewage" is not
so "defined", so the Court must arrive at a point wherein the
commonly-accepted meaning of common words must be utilized in the
statutory construction. [Note, however, that the phrase "domestic
sewage" IS DEFINED by administrative regulation
below

as described

so as to NOT be a "solid waste", so it (the domestic

sewage) could NOT be a "hazardous waste".]
Section 19-6-502, as "definitions" for the "Solid Waste
Management Act", provides in relevant part:
19-6-502. Definitions.
As used in this part:

(7) "Solid waste" means all putrescible and
nonputrescible materials
or
substances
discarded or rejected as being spent,
useless, worthless, or in excess to the
owner's needs at the time of discard or
rejection,
including
garbage,
refuse,
industrial and commercial waste, sludges
from air or water control facilities,
rubbish, ashes, contained gaseous material,
incinerator
residue,
demolition,
and
construction debris, discarded automobiles
and offal, but not including sewage and
other highly diluted water carried materials
or substances and those in gaseous form.

Emphasis added. It is obvious that the Legislature does not
believe or intend that "sewage" and or wastes "in gaseous form"
be characterized as "solid wastes". The "bottom line" is that the
statutory definition specifically EXCLUDES "domestic sewage" from

7

the

"definition"

of

"hazardous

waste".

SUCH

SHOULD

END

THE

DISCUSSION!
The Riverton Elementary School sanitary sewer discharges,
including the "gaseous material" in the form of the hydrogen
sulfide ("rotten egg") gas, are contained within and contemplated
by the phrase "domestic sewage" and thus, "hydrogen sulfide" gas
from this type of activity (i.e. operation of the public school)
IS NOT a "hazardous waste" within the meaning of state statutes,
including

Section 63-30-10 (18) (c) of the Immunity Act.

The Plaintiffs' interpretation
is

NOT

"hazardous

waste")

is

(that the hydrogen sulfide
further

bolstered

by

the

administrative agency regulations adopted pursuant to statutory
authority

[Section 19-6-106, Utah Code] and for the purpose of

implementing

and

enforcing

those

regulatory

functions.

Administrative Regulation R315-1-1, pertaining to "Utah Hazardous
Waste

Definitions

purposes

of

definitions

the

and

References",

"administrative

contained

in

incorporates

regulations"

Sections

the

19-6-102, Utah

for

the

statutory
Code.

The

administrative regulations EXCLUDE "domestic sewage" from being
a "solid waste", which thus precludes those materials from being
a "hazardous waste", by providing in relevant part:
R315-2-4. Exclusions.
(a)

MATERIALS WHICH ARE NOT SOLID WASTES.

The following materials are not solid wastes for the
purposes of this rule:
(1) Domestic sewage or any mixture of
domestic sewage and other wastes that passes
through a sewer system to a publicly-owned
treatment works for treatment. "Domestic
8

sewage" means untreated sanitary wastes that
pass through a sewer system.
Emphasis added. The Riverton Elementary School sanitary sewer
wastes at issue in this litigation are "untreated sanitary wastes
that pass through a sewer system", per the second sentence of the
"definition". Thus, working backwards, the "domestic sewage" is
not a "solid waste" and thus it is NOT a "hazardous waste". For
sure, the hydrogen sulfide gases within the sewer line

whether

those gases are in fact a constituent part of the liquid sewer
effluent or not

are, in fact and in law, "untreated sanitary

wastes that pass through a sewer system". End of discussion!
The Defendant DISTRICT asserts [page 30 of APPELLEE'S BRIEF]
that the Plaintiffs
"ignore the plain language of the hazardous
definition in 40 C.F.R. §261.3(a)(2)(ii).

waste

Defendant's rhetoric has several flaws. These are disclosed by a
careful examination of the text of the federal regulation, which
provides, in pertinent part:
261.3 Definition of hazardous waste.
(a) A solid waste, as defined in §261.2, is a hazardous
waste if:
(1) It is not excluded from regulation as a
hazardous waste under §261.4(b);
and
(2) It meets any of the following criteria:
(ii) It is listed in subpart D of
this
part
and
has
not
been
excluded
from the lists under
subpart D of this part
under
§260.20
and
260.22
of
this
Chapter.

Emphasis added.

The first flaw in Defendant's assertion is the self-serving
OMISSION of subparagraph (1) from the analysis: subparagraph (1)
must be included, due to the word "and" (as distinguished from
the word "or") between the two subparagraphs.
But the fatal flaw of Defendant's assertion is its failure
to examine the provisions of §262.4(a), which provides:
§261.4

Exclusions.

(a) Materials which are not solid wastes.
following materials are not solid wastes for
purposes of this part:

The
the

(1)(i) Domestic sewage; and
(ii) Any mixture of domestic sewage and
other wastes that passes through a sewer
system to a publicly-owned treatment works
for treatment. "Domestic
sewage" means
untreated sanitary wastes that pass through
a sewer system.
Emphasis added.
The Defendant has conveniently ignored the provisions of the
controlling regulation! The Defendant DISTRICT might argue that
the provisions of §261.4(a) are not expressly incorporated into
the provisions of §261.3

[Definition of hazardous waste], and

thus are inapplicable to §261.3. WRONG! WRONG! Section 261.4(a)
IS APPLICABLE. First, because the provision is there, "in the
book, on the page"! A mere quarter-inch away from the provisions
of Section 261.3.
expressly
expressing

provide
an

Secondly,
"for

the

the provisions
purposes

all-encompassing

of

"definition"

of Section
this

part",

261.4
thus

(or modification

thereof) for the entire "Part" of the federal regulation: namely,
§§261.1, 261.2, 261.3, and so forth! Federal regulations of a
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technical

nature

are hard

enough

to read

and understand

as

written, without requiring them to contain every "exception" and
every "exemption" in the exact same grammatical sentence to which
they

obviously

refer!

Defendant's

narrow

and

self-serving

selection of text is misplaced and erroneous!
In similar vein, Defendant's assertion that the mere LISTING
of

"hydrogen

incorrect

sulfide" within 40 C.F.R. §261.33

and

out-of-context!

This

is

similarly

inappropriateness

is

illustrated by a careful reading of the federal regulation, as
follows:
§261.33 Discarded commercial chemical products, offspecification species, container residues, and spill
residues thereof.
The following materials or items are hazardous wastes
if and when they are discarded or intended to be
discarded as described in §261.2(a) (2) (i) , when they
are mixed with waste oil or used oil or other material
and applied to the land for dust suppression or road
treatment, when they are otherwise applied to the land
in lieu of their original intended use or when they are
contained in products that are applied to the land
when, in lieu of their original intended use, they are
produced for use as (or as a component of) a fuel,
distributed for use as a fuel, or burned as a fuel.

(f) The commercial chemical products, manufacturing
chemical intermediates, or of f-specification commercial
chemical products referred to in paragraphs (a) through
(d) of this section, are identified as toxic wastes
(T) , unless otherwise designated and are subject to the
small quantity generator exclusion defined in §261.5 (a)
and (g) . These wastes and their corresponding EPA
Hazardous Waste Numbers are:

U-135

7783-06-4

Hydrogen sulfide H2S

11

Emphasis added. That "hydrogen sulfide" is so LISTED does not
mean that is a "hazardous waste". To the contrary! The "listing"
is grossly out-of-context.x
The "listing" of hydrogen sulfide in Appendix VIII following
the

narrative

provisions

of

40

C.F.R.

§261

is

similarly

misanalyzed by the Defendant. Appendix VIII of 40 C.F.R. §261, by
its own terms, is devoid of any explanation of what the pageslong

"appendix"

constituents".

even
There

is,

other

are

but

than
two

contained in 40 C.F.R. §261.2 (d)

brief

title

"hazardous

references

both

as to what is intended by

Appendix VIII. Subsection 2 61.2(d)(3)
is significant

its

THE only reference which

shows the inappropriateness of the DISTRICT'S

x

The inappropriateness of the DISTRICT'S reliance upon and
analysis of 40 C.F.R. §261.33 is further illustrated by the
"comment" actually included within the text of the federal
regulation, as follows:
[Comment: The phrase "commercial chemical product or
manufacturing chemical intermediate having the generic
name listed in . . ." refers to a chemical substance
which is manufactured or formulated for commercial or
manufacturing use which consists of commercially pure
grade of the chemical, any technical grades of the
chemical that are produced or marketed, and all
formulations in which the chemical is the sole active
ingredient. It does not refer to a material, such as a
manufacturing process waste, that contain any of the
substances listed in paragraph (e) or (f) . Where a
manufacturing process waste is deemed to be a hazardous
waste because it contains a substance listed in paragraph
(e) or (f), such waste will be listed in either §261.31
or §261.32 or will be identified as a hazardous waste by
the characteristics set forth in subpart C of this part.]
Emphasis added. Obviously, 40 C.F.R. §261.33 is concerned with
"commercially pure grades" of the chemical, "produced or marketed",
etc. Obviously, the "sewer gas" vented from the sewer line lateral
of the Riverton Elementary School, even if such might contain
"hydrogen sulfide" gas, is something other than what the federal
regulation is concerned with.
12
fTcoucM

n. UOIX/IPR

assertions, by providing:
(3) The Administrator will use the following criteria
to add wastes to that list:
(i) (A)
The
materials
are
ordinarily
disposed of, burned, or incinerated; or
(B) The
materials
contain
toxic
constituents listed in appendix VIII of part
261
and
these
constituents
are
not
ordinarily
found
in raw materials
or
products for which the materials substitute
(or are found in raw materials or products
in small concentrations) and are not used or
reused during the recycling process; and
(ii) The material may pose a substantial hazard to
human health and the environment when recycled.
Emphasis added. Obviously, Appendix VIII to Part 261 of 40 C.F.R.
has been relied upon by the DISTRICT in an extreme out-of-context
manner.

The

LISTING

of

"hydrogen

sulfide"

as

a

"hazardous

constituent" has NO LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE to the situation-at-hand.
The Defendant DISTRICT'S arguments

[page 26 of APPELLEE'S

BRIEF] that the hydrogen sulfide gas at issue is not "domestic
sewage"

(as

"defined"

in

the

UTAH

STATUTES,

the

Utah

administrative regulations, and even in the pertinent federal
regulations) because the hydrogen sulfide is being pumped from
the sewer lines BEFORE the gas reaches the sewage

treatment

facility BORDERS ON THE RIDICULOUS. The gas is being pumped FROM
THE SANITARY SEWER LINE. The vent pipe is connected directly to
the sanitary sewer line. The DISTRICT'S argument might have merit
if the "vent pipe" were connected to the roof of the school and
sucked air and/or odors DIRECTLY out of the rooms. But such is
not the situation at hand. The hydrogen sulfide gases

and who

knows what other obnoxious and offensive other odors, vapors and
13

gases from other parts of the entire system

are part of the

"domestic sewage", as so defined. The obvious legislative intent--to EXCLUDE "domestic sewage" and its related constituent gases
from the definition of "hazardous waste"
in

a

rhetorical

sleight-of-hand

of

cannot be overlooked

such

an

absurd

factual

argument!
The

"bottom

administrative

line" is that

regulations,

AND

the Utah
the

statutes,

federal

the Utah

administrative

regulations, uniformly and consistently, EXPRESSLY PROVIDE that
"domestic sewage" is not

"hazardous waste". If the

"domestic

sewage", by definition, is not a "hazardous waste", then its
naturally-occurring constituent components

including hydrogen

sulfide gas, in relatively minute albeit offensive quantities
cannot be a "hazardous waste" within the contemplation of those
statutes and regulations!
B
SEWER LINE "HYDROGEN SULFIDE" GAS
IS NOT A "HAZARDOUS MATERIAL"
UNDER FEDERAL REGULATIONS
Subsection 19-6-302 of the "Hazardous Substances Mitigation
Act"

of Utah defines

"hazardous materials", by providing

relevant part:
19-6-302. Definitions.
As used in this part:

(7) "Hazardous materials" means hazardous
waste as defined in the Utah Hazardous Waste
Management
Regulations,
PCBs,
dioxin,
asbestos, or a substance regulated under 42
U.S.C., Section 6991(2),
14
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Emphasis added. Although Section 19-6-302(7) "defines" the phrase
"hazardous materials", the phrase "hazardous materials" IS NOT
FURTHER EVEN MENTIONED within the remainder of the statutory
provisions

of

Part

3 of

Chapter

6 of Title

19. The phrase

"hazardous materials" is nevertheless so "defined" to be one of
the following items:
1.
a "hazardous waste" as defined in
Hazardous Waste Management Regulations;
2.

a PCB;

3.

dioxin;

4.

asbestos; or

the

Utah

5.
a substance regulated under 42 U.S.C., Section
6991(2).
Emphasis added.
The analysis shown above evidences that the hydrogen sulfide
IS NOT a "hazardous waste as defined in the Utah Hazardous Waste
Management

Regulations".

The

DISTRICT

does

claim

that

the

"hydrogen sulfide" is "a substance regulated under 42 U.S.C.,
Section 6991." In analyzing the meaning of the federal statutes,
one must first consider what the Utah Legislature had in mind
when

it utilized

the words

"a substance

regulated

under 42

U.S.C., Section 6991(2)" .
In the instant situation, there is NO FACTUAL "regulation"
of the hydrogen sulfide "vented" by the District from its sewer
line at the Riverton Elementary School! In this context, the Utah
Legislature utilized the word "regulated"
the word

"defined". The wording

"regulated under" connotes a

15
STFPHFM a

as contrasted with

uni\/iCD

FACTUAL REGULATION.
The DISTRICT acknowledges [page 21 of APPELLEE7S BRIEF] that
42 U.S.C. §6991 applies to "underground storage tank" regulation.
Thus,

the

first

question

Legislature intended

to

be

answered

is

whether

the

for governmental immunity purposes

to

truncate the analysis, or would be inclined to go further in the
"daisy chain" arguments advanced by Defendant DISTRICT.
Hydrogen sulfide as a "hazardous" air pollutant
The Defendant DISTRICT asserts

[p. 22 of its BRIEF] that

hydrogen sulfide
. . . is listed as a hazardous air pollutant in Section
112 of the Clean Air Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. §7412.
In subsection (r) of this section, which addresses the
prevention of accidental releases of "any substance
listed pursuant to paragraph (3) or any other extremely
hazardous substance," paragraph
(3) directs the
Administrator to promulgate a list of hazardous
substances, and expressly directs that "[t]the initial
list shall include . . . hydrogen sulfide. . . " 4 2
U.S.C. §7412(r) (1), (r) (3) (emphasis added) . Therefore,
hydrogen sulfide is specifically identified as a
hazardous air pollutant in this section, and it is
therefore a hazardous substance under 42 U.S.C.
§9601(14) , and is as a matter of law a hazardous
material under Utah Code Ann. §19-6-302(7).
APPELLEE'S BRIEF, page 22. Emphasis added.
IF the Clean Air Act is, as indicated in the quoted text,
concerned

with

the

"prevention

of

accidental

releases"

of

hydrogen sulfide and other "hazardous substances", it certainly
is perplexing and counter-intuitive to believe that the Defendant
DISTRICT'S actions in INTENTIONALLY AND CONTINUOUSLY RELEASING
hydrogen sulfide into the atmosphere would not be the subject of
regulatory oversight and prohibition! NO PERMIT! NO REGULATORY
OVERSIGHT!

The

DISTRICT

is

simply
16

"venting"

the

"hazardous

material"

into the atmosphere! And

then the DISTRICT

claims

"immunity" for the "nuisance" that activity is!
The truth of the matter is that the Clean Air Act DOES NOT
"list" hydrogen sulfide as an "hazardous substance". See Act of
December 4, 1991, which DELETED
listing

of

"air

pollutants"

"hydrogen

under

42

sulfide" from the
§7412.2

U.S.C.

See

ATTACHMENT 1 to this APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF.
Opposing counsel has overlooked a significant amendment to
the

statute.

In

light

of

the

CONGRESSIONAL

REPEAL

of

any

"listing" of hydrogen sulfide as a "hazardous air pollutant", AS
A MATTER OF LAW hydrogen sulfide CANNOT NOW BE CHARACTERIZED AS
A "HAZARDOUS MATERIAL", under the Clean Air Act and other federal
statutes (at least for airborne discharges)!
Hydrogen sulfide as a maritime pollutant
Similarly, Defendant DISTRICT'S reliance upon the LISTING of
hydrogen sulfide as a "hazardous substance" under the provisions
of 40 C.F.R. §116.4 [contained as EXHIBIT 7 to APPELLEE'S BRIEF],
as promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency for the
protection and purity of the nations maritime (oceanic) waters,
has no application here. Utah
"oceanfront"

and

certainly

a "landlocked" state having no

no maritime

2

waters

or

connection

Page 3 73 of the United States Code Service volume, current as
of 1997, applicable to 42 U.S.C. § 7412, contains the following
entry as part of the "legislative history" of §7412 of the Clean
Air Act:
1991.
Act Dec. 4, 1991, insubsec. (b)(1),
deleted "77 83 064 Hydrogen sulfide" from the
list of pollutants.
Emphasis added. See ATTACHMENT 1 to this APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF.
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thereto

cannot be concerned with these "maritime" pollutants,

which undoubtedly pose great danger to those maritime waters and
the plant and animal life therein. The airborne discharge of
hydrogen sulfide gas by the DISTRICT has no application the
maritime pollution regulations, "definitions" or listings!
conclusion:
That

the

Defendant,

WITHOUT

ANY

KIND

OF

PERMIT

OR

RESTRICTION is apparently allowed, with apparent impunity, to
discharge untold quantities of the claimed pollutant into the
atmosphere,

24 hours

a day,

seven days

a week

in direct

contradiction to the very statutes and regulations it relies upon
as "authority" for "governmental immunity" purposes certainly
brings into question the accuracy and validity of its legal
position.
In the instant situation, there is NO FACTUAL "regulation"
of the hydrogen sulfide "vented" by the District from its sewer
line, IN UNCONTROLLED QUANTITIES INTO THE ATMOSPHERE! In this
context,
The Utah Legislature utilized
Section 19-6-302
retaining

the word

"regulated"

as contrasted with the word "defined"

"governmental

immunity".

It

is

suspect

Legislature intended that a governmental entity

that

in
in
the

(such as the

Defendant DISTRICT), having no "statutory responsibility" for the
"handling" of "hazardous materials", would grant "immunity" (i.e.
the entity cannot be sued at all) for "negligently" handling
those UNREGULATED

"hazardous materials"

simply

uncontrolled quantities INTO THE ATMOSPHERE!
18

"vented"

in

The wording "regulated under" connotes a FACTUAL REGULATION.
The hydrogen sulfide is not FACTUALLY "regulated". The "hydrogen
sulfide" with which we are here dealing is not the same "hydrogen
sulfide" as described to be a "commercial chemical product",
applied

"to the

land",

etc. The

"hydrogen

sulfide" gas, in

relatively minute quantities within the "domestic sewage" from
the Riverton Elementary School, are not and were not intended to
be "discarded" as described in the federal regulations! The mere
"listing"

of

the

"hydrogen

sulfide"

chemical

within

a

long

"laundry list" enumeration of chemical substances does not make
the Riverton Elementary School "hydrogen sulfide" a "hazardous
material" or "hazardous waste", when the introductory text (and
other regulations) obviously and expressly mandate a contrary
conclusion. The FEDERAL REGULATIONS, as cited by the Defendant,
DO NOT APPLY TO THE CASE AT HAND! The DISTRICT'S reliance upon
the quoted regulations is inappropriate and misplaced.
The Defendant's claimed "immunity" defense is an illusory
argument, born of desperation and not deserving
belief

or

application!

The

judgment

of

the

of

judicial

District

Court

granting summary judgment must be overturned!
Ill
OTHER DISTRICT ARGUMENTS
The DISTRICT'S arguments [page 15 of APPELLEE'S BRIEF] that
the DISTRICT'S actions are merely following the mandate of statepromulgated

administrative

regulations

[for

odor-free

rooms

within schools] are misplaced, for at least two reasons. First,
a careful reading of the regulation
19

[Rule R392-200-6(B) (2) (b)]

indicates the regulation applies to those "rooms from which
obnoxious odors, vapors or fumes originate": the rest rooms,
perhaps the cafeteria kitchens, the high school industrial arts
room where welding and metal fabricating activities (in which
odorous

petroleum-based

"cutting

oils"

might

be

used)

are

conducted, and even the high school "chemistry lab", in which
"rotten egg gas" is intentionally produced as part of the
educational instruction! The regulation requires the "room" be
"mechanically vented to the outside of the building". In the
instant situation, the DISTRICT wasn't venting the "room" or even
the "building" at large
the

sanitary

sewer

which should have been separated from

"lateral"

(which

was

"vented")

by

an

effective, water-filled P-trap which prevents the odors from the
sewer line from entering the structure in the first instance!
Unless the P-trap between the sanitary lateral connection and the
building

(and or the individual plumbing fixtures and drains

therein) were completely dry so as to allow an unobstructed air
passage from the room into the sewer line outside the building,
it

would

be

physically

and

mechanically

impossible

to

"mechanically vent" the building in that manner: water-filled Ptrap prevents the passage of air directly from the building into
the sewer lateral, and vice-versa. The motor-driven "venting" fan
could run continuously, but would suck ONLY those gases and odors
from the sewer lateral and perhaps the rest of the underground
sewer lines! Such a misguided

approach to the problem was

destined for failure from the inception thereof, as evidenced by
the DISTRICT'S ultimate temporary "closure" of the Elementary
20
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School for several weeks (in February and March 1998)

during

which time the venting fan was continuously operation until the
DISTRICT, facing a "temporary restraining order" hearing later
that day, "capped" the "vent pipe".
The

DISTRICT

does

not deny

committing

the activities

complained of. The DISTRICT, however, relies entirely on the
"governmental immunity" allegedly afforded it under Section 6330-10(18) (c)

["handling, mitigating

or regulating

hazardous

materials or hazardous wastes"] as a shield to Plaintiffs7
"nuisance" claims.
IV
PLAINTIFF'S "INVERSE CONDEMNATION" CLAIMS
The Defendant DISTRICT asserts that it is entitled to
summary

judgment

counsel's
deposition

because

statements

that

the Plaintiff
the

did not object to

Plaintiffs

stated

in their

their real property did not suffer a permanent

diminishment of value. That's not true. The Plaintiffs did object
to that characterization.
The real question whether the summary judgment may stand is
whether the Defendant has produced "affidavits" and other sworn
testimony to show that there is no "genuine dispute as to
material fact". The operative "factual" issues pertaining to the
"taking" and the "damaging" of the private property
there was not "permanent" damage
still has not grown back)

even if

(although Plaintiff's grass

are in genuine dispute and a not

overcome by the self-serving statements of opposing counsel
during oral argument.
21

In reviewing a summary judgment, the Supreme Court must
evaluate the facts and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn
therefrom in a light most favorable to the party opposing summary
judgment.

Guardian State Bank vs Humpherys, 762 P. 2d 1084, 1086

(Utah 1988); Horgan vs

Industrial Design Corporation, 657 P.2d

751, 752 (Utah 1982) .
As no evidence was actually before the Court at the "summary
judgment hearing" on the "taking or damaging" issue, there was no
basis for the Court to make any "findings" on that factuallyintensive issue!
CONCLUSION
The

Defendant

SCHOOL

DISTRICT

has

no

"statutory

responsibility" to "handle" or "mitigate" the claimed "hazardous
waste" or "hazardous materials". Thus, following the common-sense
reading and application of the Governmental Immunity Act and its
text utilized in Williams, Branam and Standford, the Court should
rule

simply

that

the

Legislature

did

not

intend

to

retain

immunity for the handling everyday "domestic sewage", even if a
small constituent part thereof might be "hydrogen sulfide" gas.
As a matter of law, hydrogen sulfide is NOT a "hazardous
waste", as defined by Utah statute, which expressly excludes
"domestic sewage" from being "hazardous waste". Pertinent state
and federal administrative regulations are consistent in that
exclusion!
Similarly, the "hydrogen sulfide" gas emanating from the
sanitary sewer line is not a "hazardous material" under pertinent
state statute and/or correlated federal statute or administrative
22

regulation. The federal regulations relied upon by the Defendant
are, according to the express terminology of those regulations,
inapplicable factually and legally to the case at bar! The mere
presence of the compound hydrogen sulfide in an extensive LISTING
does not mean that hydrogen sulfide is a "hazardous material",
particularly

when

closer

examination

and

reading

of

the

introductory text evidences otherwise!
Similarly,

the District

Court's

ruling granting

summary

judgment on the "inverse condemnation" was erroneous. The facts
with respect

to the

"damaging" or

"taking" were in dispute.

Plaintiff submitted no hard evidence (affidavits, etc.) to show
otherwise. The trial court also erred in its application of the
"immunity" to the "inverse condemnation" claims.
The District Court decisions must be reversed and the case
remanded for the jury trial on the merits.
Respectfully submitted this 13th day of December, 2001.
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ATTACHMENT

1

Excerpt of 1997 volume of United States Code Service
"legislative history" of 42 U.S.C. §7412 [Clean Air Act]
showing DELETION of "hydrogen sulfide" from list of pollutants

42 USCS § 7412

AIR POLLUTION CONTROL

^ u
TK^fe

finds that the technology to implement such standards is not available
and the operation of such source is required for reasons of national
security An exemption under this paragraph may be extended for one
or more additional periods, each penod not to exceed two years The
President shall make a report to Congress with respect to each exemption (or extension thereof) made under this paragraph
"(d) State implementation and enforcement (1) Each State may develop
and submit to the Administrator a procedure for implementing and
enforcing emission standards for hazardous air pollutants for stationary sources located in such State If the Administrator finds the State
procedure is adequate, he shall delegate to such State any authority
he has under this Act to implement and enforce such standards
(2) Nothing in this subsection shall prohibit the Administrator from
enforcing any applicable emission standard under this section
"(e) Design, equipment, work practice, and operational standards (1)
For purposes of this section, if in the judgment of the Administrator, it
is not feasible to prescribe or enforce an emission standard for control of
a hazardous air pollutant or pollutants, he may instead promulgate a
design, equipment, work practice, or operational standard, or combination thereof, which in his judgment is adequate to protect the public
health from such pollutant or pollutants with an ample margin of safety
In the event the Administrator promulgates a design or equipment standard under this subsection, he shall include as part of such standard such
requirements as will assure the proper operation and maintenance of any
such element of design or equipment
"(2) For the purpose of this subsection, the phrase 'not feasible to
prescribe or enforce an emission standard' means any situation in
which the Administrator determines that (A) a hazardous pollutant
or pollutants cannot be emitted through a conveyance designed and
constructed to emit or capture such pollutant, or that any requirement for, or use of, such a conveyance would be inconsistent with any
Federal, State, or local law, or (B) the application of measurement
methodology to a particular class of sources is not practicable due to
technological or economic limitations
"(3) If after notice and opportunity for public hearing, any person
establishes to the satisfaction of the Administrator that an alternative
means of emission limitation will achieve a reduction in emissions of
any air pollutant at least equivalent to the reduction in emissions of
such air pollutant achieved under the requirements of paragraph (1),
the Administrator shall permit the use of such alternative by the
source for purposes of compliance with this section with respect to
such pollutant
"(4) Any standard promulgated under paragraph (1) shall be promul
gated in terms of an emission standard whenever it becomes feasible
to promulgate and enforce such standard in such terms
"(5) Any design, equipment, work practice, or operational standard,
or any combination thereof, described in this subsection shall be
treated as an emission standard for purposes of the provisions of this
Act (other than the provisions of this subsection)
I 1991. Act Dec 4, 1991, in subsec (b)(1), deleted 7783064 Hydrogen I i, j ,
[ sulfide" from the list of pollutants
I y^7 y F v
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